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The case for remote work goes well beyond its use during the covid-19 global pandemic. Over 
the last ten years, research from a variety of subdisciplines in economics and other social 
sciences collectively makes a strong case for the viability of remote work for the long-run. 
This paper brings this research together to argue remote work (also called telework) is likely 
to become far more common in the future for four reasons. First, the productivity of 
individual workers who switch to remote work is comparable or higher than their colocated 
peers, at least in some industries. Second, matching firms to geographically distant workers 
is becoming easier thanks to technological and social developments. Third, remote workers 
tend to be cheaper because workers value geographic flexibility and the ability to work 
remotely. Fourth, the benefits of knowledge spillovers from being physically close to other 
knowledge workers has been falling and may no longer exist in many domains of knowledge. 
While the prevalence of remote work (pre-covid-19) is small, I show it was already rising 
rapidly with plenty of room to continue growing. Finally, I argue remote work has positive 
externalities and should be promoted by policy-makers. 
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As I am writing today, in the midst of the Covid-19 global pandemic, the case for short-term 
remote work is obvious. What other choices do organizations have to keep the lights on when 
their workers are isolating themselves to slow the spread of disease? I’m one of these people: 
Iowa State University, where I teach, has rapidly switched to remote instruction for the rest 
of the semester. 
 
But I began writing this essay several months before the first cases of Covid-19 were reported 
in the popular press, and the ideas in it have been coalescing for more than a year. Covid-19 
makes an obvious case for short-term remote work, also called telework. But I am arguing 
that the case for ​long-term​ remote work is much stronger than has typically been 
appreciated. Remote work does not have to be merely an emergency response, to be 
discarded when the pandemic subsides. It can be the new normal for many industries. 
Moreover, I think it ​will​ be the new normal and that this is desirable and should be 
encouraged. These reasons go far beyond maintaining business continuity during pandemics. 
 
My arguments mostly rely on academic research published within the last ten years. 
Individually, any one of these articles is suggestive. Taken together I think they make a 
forceful case that remote work is going to become much more common in the years ahead. 
This work is split across multiple academic subdisciplines, and I have not seen it brought 
together in one place. That is the goal of this essay. 
 
Before beginning, let’s agree on some terms. By remote work, I mean individuals working 
physically distant from collaborating coworkers. In this essay, remote work can certainly 
mean working from home, but it can also mean working in a coffee shop, or a coworking 
space, or even in a satellite office. As long as the work is done mostly physically separated 
from collaborating coworkers, I call the work remote. In this essay, when collaborating 
coworkers are physically clustered together in the same physical workplace, I say the firm is 
colocated. 
 
Let me also make clear what I am not claiming. I am not claiming that all industries will go 
remote - only more. I am not claiming that we will all work from home - only that this will 
become more common, alongside working from coworking spaces and satellite offices. I am 
not claiming that big cities will “disappear” - only that the choice to live in them will not be 
driven as much by the need to colocate near firms. 
 
Most importantly, I am not claiming that remote collaboration is “better” than face-to-face 
communication. All else equal, collaborating face-to-face probably ​is​ better than 
collaborating remotely. But collaborating remotely offers its own advantages: firms that use a 
remote workforce can hire more productive workers for less.  
 
What I am arguing in this essay is that technological and social changes have reached a 
tipping point and remote work will become more and more common going forward. 
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1. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this paper, the framework for thinking about the decision to hire a remote worker is based 
on a simple model of a firm deciding whether to make a position remote or colocated. Firms 
prefer whichever offers a higher return, defined as the value the worker brings in divided by 
their wage. For economist readers, the value of either option is the marginal product of labor 
multiplied by the price of the firm’s output ​p​. For non-economist readers, that’s simply the 
extra revenue the position brings in: marginal product of labor means the additional goods 
or services that the position lets the firm sell for price ​p​. 
 
In the model, a remote worker’s marginal product is denoted by ​Q​
r​, which represents the 
expected “quality” of a new remote hire. The expected quality of a new colocated hire is 
denoted ​Q​
c​ ​but their marginal product is ​augmented​ by two advantages of colocation. I use ​A 
to denote the increased productivity of an individual colocated worker, relative to a remote 
counterpart, and ​S​ to denote the increased productivity that stems from local knowledge 
spillovers. I’ll discuss each of these in more detail below, but one reason I separate ​A ​and ​S 
because evidence related to each​ ​belongs to distinct academic literatures. Taken together, the 
marginal product of a colocated worker is the product ​ASQ​
c​, whereas the marginal product of 
a remote worker is simply ​Q​
r​. 
 
We can think of ​A ​as measuring the importance of colocated traits of work (relative to remote 
analogues) such as: the relative ease of communicating ideas face-to-face or in a conference 
with a shared whiteboard; relatively better access to physical machines, artifacts, and 
customers; relatively stronger incentives to work hard when under the supervision of 
colocated managers and surrounded by colocated peers. If workers are more productive 
when colocated, then ​A ​is greater than 1. “​A​” falls when remote technology for collaboration 
improves.  
 
The term ​S​ is a measure of the increase in productivity of colocated workers, relative to 
remote ones, due to “knowledge spillovers” from other colocated people. Think of this as 
measuring the productivity-enhancing exposure to new ideas and fresh perspectives from 
other geographically proximate workers (both in the firm and the city), as well as the 
increased ease of transferring this knowledge. If a worker’s productivity is increased by being 
physically near other workers and their knowledge, then ​S​ is greater than 1. As it gets easier 
to access their ideas remotely, ​S​ falls.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates how ​A​ and ​S​ might vary for a set of five example positions.  
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Figure 1. Plotting Positions in Terms of Relative Productivity (​A​) and Local 
Knowledge Spillovers (​S​) 
 
Note: This figure illustrates how the relative productivity advantage of colocation varies 
across five hypothetical positions. 
 
In figure 1, the dashed lines indicate ​A ​= 1 and ​S​ = 1, which corresponds to the case where 
there are no advantages to a worker of a given quality being colocated. In the upper right 
quadrant, colocated workers of a given quality are more productive than remote ones. We 
would expect this to be the case for many positions, and I have given a few examples. 
 
In the upper right corner of figure 1 is the position of lab technician, who needs to be 
physically present in the lab to perform their duties and also benefits significantly from being 
around other technicians who can share knowledge and ideas. The position cannot easily be 
done remotely, and this is represented by high values of ​A​ and ​S​. Alternatively, the web 
developer position can perform their work tasks nearly as well at home as in the office (low 
A​). However, the position benefits a lot from being near other developers, with whom they 
can share ideas and discuss problems. The presence of these strong knowledge spillovers is 
represented by a high ​S​. In contrast, the waiter position does not benefit at all from 
knowledge spillovers (​S ​= 1), but a worker needs to be physically present to perform their 
work tasks (high ​A​). 
 
In this example, a therapist has moderate values of ​A​ and ​S​, indicating there is some real 
advantage to being physically present and colocated with other workers, but this advantage is 
not large. Lastly, a call center operator does not benefit from knowledge spillovers (​S​ = 1), 
and is slightly more productive when working remotely than when working in an office (​A ​< 
1). 
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Looking at figure 1, clearly firms will prefer to make a position remote if it falls in the lower 
left quadrant, where ​A ​and ​S​ are less than 1 and remote workers more productive than 
colocated ones. But this is not the only case where remote workers are preferred. 
 
In this paper, I focus on two additional advantages of remote work: (1) remote positions may 
attract better candidates and (2) remote positions may cost less. As noted above, expected 
worker quality is denoted by , ​where ​i​ = ​r ​or ​c​ for remote and colocated respectively. SinceQi  
remote positions can draw on a larger pool of candidates, it may be possible to recruit better 
workers in a remote position. This would be represented by the ratio ./QQr c > 1  
 
I assume the cost of a worker is their wage ​w​
i​ where ​i​ = ​r ​or​ c​ for remote and colocated 
respectively. This may vary with the cost of living in different places, and if workers think of 
the option to work remotely as a benefit. If colocated workers are more expensive than 
remote ones, this can be represented by the ratio ./wwc r > 1  
 
In this simple framework, firms will make a position remote (instead of colocated) if the 
return on a remote worker (the revenue they bring in divided by their cost) exceeds the 
return on a colocated worker. The return on a remote worker is ​pQ​
r​ divided by the wage of a 
remote worker ​w​
r​. The return on a colocated worker is ​pASQ​c​ divided by the wage of a 
remote worker ​w​
c​.. The condition that the return on a remote worker exceeds the return on a 
colocated one can be expressed with the following inequality: 
 
ASQ /w /wp c c ≤ pQr r  
 
This equation can be rearranged as follows: 
 
(1) /wA × S ≤ Q /Qr c × wc r  
 
This equation organizes the rest of this paper. It says firms will prefer to make a position 
remote if the productivity advantage of colocation (​AS​) is more than offset by access to 
higher quality remote workers ( ) and/or higher costs of colocated labor ( )./QQr c /wwc r   
 
For example, suppose that the higher cost of living in urban centers and a preference to work 
at home means the colocated wage is 30% higher than the comparable remote wage 
 and that access to a larger labor market means the expected quality of a remotew /w .3)( c r = 1  
worker is 15% greater than the local labor market . Since , thisQ /Q .15)( r c = 1 .3 .15 .51 × 1 = 1  
implies a colocated worker must be at least 1.5 times as productive as a remote one for a firm 
to prefer to make a position colocated .A .5)( × S > 1   
 
This example is illustrated in figure 2 below. All combinations of ​AS​ < 1.5 are shaded in blue. 
Firms prefer to make any position with ​A​ and ​S​ in this region a remote one. As we would 
expect, firms prefer to make all positions in the lower-left quadrant remote; this corresponds 
to positions where remote workers have higher productivity than colocated ones. However, 
firms also prefer to make some of the positions in the upper right quadrant remote. These 
are positions where colocated workers of the same quality are more productive than remote 
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ones, but not so much more productive that it is worth forgoing the cost savings and higher 
quality of matches that a remote position enables.  
 
 
Figure 2: Types of Positions where Remote Workers are Preferred 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the set of positions with values of ​A​ and ​S​ where remote 
workers are preferred, highlighted in blue, if ./w .5Q /Qr c × wc r = 1  
 
Equation 1 and figure 2 makes it clear that it is ​not​ necessary for the technology of remote 
work to be as good as colocated work ( ), nor for there to be no spillovers fromA ≤ 1  
colocation ( ), in order for firms to prefer to hire remotely. Note, for example, in figure 2S ≤ 1  
that a firm would prefer to make the therapist position remote, even though there are real 
advantages to colocation in the position.  
 
The rest of this paper will present evidence that the left-hand side of equation (1) is not as 
large as commonly believed and shrinking; and the right-hand side of equation (1) is large 
and growing. Expressed in terms of figure 2, I will be arguing that positions are drifting down 
and to the left, so that positions that used to be better colocated (such as the web developer 
in Figure 1) are now better remote (i.e., they have or will move into the blue region in Figure 
2). At the same time, I will argue that the quality and wage differentials are also shifting in a 
manner favorable to remote work. In terms of the figure, the blue region is expanding up and 
to the right. 
 
Specifically, section 2 of this paper will review evidence on the productivity of remote versus 
colocated workers and argue ​A​ is close to or less than 1 in many cases. Section 3 will argue 
the expected quality of remote workers relative to colocated ones ( ), is rising. Section 4/QQr c  
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will present evidence that cost-of-living differences and a preference for remote work make 
the cost of remote positions less than the cost of colocated ones, and give reasons why the 
colocated wage premium may be rising. Section 5 will argue that the spillover term ​S​ is 
declining. Section 6 closes the main argument by presenting empirical evidence that even 
before the outbreak of covid-19, the prevalence of remote work was rising and had 
substantial scope to continue rising. 
 
Explaining Recent Trends 
Before moving on, in the remainder of this section I will show how this simple model can 
also explain why we have observed an increase in geographic concentration, even as the 
technology for remote work improves. Since at least 2005, the growth of employment in 
innovative industries has risen fastest in cities that had the largest innovative sector 
employment in 2005 (​Atkinson, Muro, Whiton 2019​). A simple way to model this is to 
assume the price ​p​ of the output of innovative industries has risen. Since the benefit of all 
workers (remote and colocated) is their marginal product multiplied by the price ​p​, this 
raised the return on all workers, and firms in innovative industries created a large number of 
new positions. These could be remote or colocated.  
 
Let us suppose that over the last several decades, improvements in communication 
technology have steadily reduced ​A​ (from very high starting levels). As equation (1) and 
figure 2 make clear, improvements in ​A​ do not necessarily lead to an increase in the 
prevalence of remote work. So long as , firms will still choose to meet theS /wA ≥ Q /Qr c × wc r  
increased demand for workers with colocated workers. And once they have decided to use 
colocated workers, they will obtain higher productivity from their workers if they locate in 
cities where spillovers are likely to be large, due to the presence of other innovative workers. 
 
While changes in ​A​ may be mostly driven by improvements in communication and 
technology, the value of ​S​ are driven in part by the collective hiring decisions of all firms. The 
increased demand for knowledge workers, and the clustering of them into cities, will tend to 
increase ​S​ over time, since there will be more workers colocated in technology hubs to 
exchange ideas with. The rise in ​S​ can partially or totally offset declines in ​A​ over the same 
period. The result is increasing concentration, even as the technology for remote work 
steadily improves. This is consistent with what has happened over the last few decades. 
 
But the model makes clear that this is just one possible equilibrium. Technology is likely to 
continue reducing ​A​ for the foreseeable future. Technological progress can also reduce ​S​ over 
time by enabling remote communication of ideas and knowledge. Meanwhile, the increase in 
S​ due to clustering tends to run into diminishing returns, since rising congestion costs 
eventually constrain the expansion of a city’s population and density. At some point, 
parameters change enough so that equation (1) begins to hold. At that point, firms will switch 
to hiring remote, rather than colocated workers. Once this dynamic begins to hold, it has the 
long-run effect of lowering ​S​, since workers no longer cluster together geographically. This 
further undermines the case for colocation, resulting in a new equilibrium where remote 
work is widespread.  
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2. Relative Productivity of Remote Work (​A​) 
 
I first examine evidence related to the parameter ​A​, which measures the relative increase in 
productivity for a worker of given quality, if they are colocated with other workers. Since this 
parameter changes with the state of information technology, I will emphasize more recent 
studies, when they are available. 
 
Gajendran and Harrison (2007)​ is a good summary of the literature up through the 
mid-2000s. The paper highlights some of the main theoretical factors that may affect the 
productivity of remote and colocated workers. While it is typically assumed remote work is 
inferior to colocation (​A​ > 1), there are a variety of reasons this may not be true. Most 
importantly, by (potentially) granting workers more flexibility in their time of work or their 
physical work environment, remote work can allow workers to better optimize for their own 
idiosyncratic preferences. Some workers may be more productive working early in the 
morning and others late at night; some are more productive in a silent enclosed space and 
others in a noisy coffee shop. By reducing stress about coordinating work schedules with 
family schedules, remote work can also allow greater focus while at work. Lastly, the 
reduction in travel time can extend the hours employees are able to work. 
 
To assess the efficacy of remote work, Gajendran and Harrison (2007) collects 46 studies of 
remote work, all of which involved actual remote work rather than lab-based simulations. All 
of these studies, however, were observational, and therefore selection effects likely bias the 
results. Unsurprisingly, they find remote work is associated with greater perceptions of 
worker autonomy and job satisfaction. It’s also associated with lower perceptions of 
work-family conflict, stress, and intent to seek new employment. For a smaller set of studies 
they also study the difference between occasional (less than 2.5 days per week) and intensive 
(more than 2.5 days per week) remote work. In general, the differences are not substantive, 
though they find evidence the quality of relationships with coworkers is worse for 
remote-workers working from home more often. 
 
Gajendran and Harrison also find remote work has no statistically significant impact on work 
performance, as rated by the individual worker, and a positive effect when rated by the 
supervisor. While we will see these results are consistent with causally identified evidence, 
they should be interpreted with caution, since it may be that only high-performing workers 
are allowed to work remotely. This is also suggested by the positive association between 
perceived relationship quality with a supervisor and remote work, which Gajendran and 
Harrison also document.  
 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2011)​ also studies the early era of remote work for the specific 
context of research collaborators who disclose inventions to their university technology 
transfer office. Over the period 1988-1999 they study 1,425 invention disclosures with 
multiple inventors. They find disclosures where some of the inventors are not local are no 
less likely to receive patents, and actually receive higher royalties for their inventions.  
 
Similarly, ​Freeman, Ganguli, and Murciano-Goroff (2014)​ study the citations received by 
academic papers for a sample of 126,000 papers published between 1990 and 2010 in the 
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fields of particle and field physics, nanoscience and nanotechnology, and biotechnology and 
applied microbiology. For each paper, they map the institution of each co-author to the 
associated city. They find papers with an international collaboration frequently receive fewer 
citations, conditional on the number of coauthors and references. However, papers by 
exclusively US coauthors, who are not colocated in the same city, receive more citations in 
the physics and biology fields studied, but less in the nanotechnology fields.  
 
Turning from academic collaboration to firms, ​Monteiro, Straume, and Velento (2019) 
provide recent evidence about the efficacy of remote work for a broad sample of firms. 
Monteiro, Straume, and Velento (2019) use a 2011-2016 survey of a representative sample of 
5,000-6,500 Portuguese firms to assess the impact of remote work on firm-level 
productivity. Lacking a precise measure of remote work, they use as a proxy a positive 
response to the question “Did your enterprise provide to the persons employed remote access 
to the enterprise’s e-mail system, documents, and applications?” In some specifications, they 
also interact this binary response with the share of employees who report using a computer 
in their work, to derive a measure of the ​potential​ extent of remote work. 
 
Simply comparing the productivity of firms that enable remote access to those that do not 
(and including some basic controls), remote-accessible firms are 15% more productive. But 
this appears to be driven by more productive firms offering remote work, rather than remote 
work making firms more productive. Although they have data on thousands of firms, their 
preferred specification includes firm-level fixed effects, meaning their identification is driven 
by the sub-sample of 394 firms whose remote work status changed over 2011-2016. Using 
this sample, they find remote work has a small but statistically significant ​negative​ effect on 
firm-level productivity. Going from 0 to 100% (potentially) remote workers decreases 
productivity by 7-10%, depending on how the sample is weighted. 
 
However, these headline numbers conceal important variation among types of firms. It turns 
out the negative impact of remote work is concentrated in lower-performing firms: mid-size 
and large firms do not see reduction in productivity when they switch to remote work; 
neither do exporters; neither do firms with high-skilled employees. In fact, firms that do 
R&D increase their productivity by 9% when they go from 0 to 100% (potentially) remote. 
 
By controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics, and industry-specific trends, Monteiro, 
Straume, and Velento (2019) provide more compelling evidence that the productivity of 
remote workers is just as high as colocated ones, at least in high-performing firms. However, 
a weakness of the paper is the noisy estimate of remote work, which is based more on the 
possibility of remote work, rather than actual uptake.  
 
Better evidence for the causal effect of remote work comes from various natural and field 
experiments. ​Sherman (2019)​ conducts a field experiment where 187 employees of a 
life-sciences company in Cambridge, UK worked from home on even or odd weeks of a 
four-week period (allowing each participant to serve as their own control). During remote 
work weeks, employees worked, on average, 2.14 days from home, compared to 0.49 during 
in-office weeks. Self-rated performance was higher during remote work weeks.  
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Bloom et al. (2015)​ describes another remote work experiment made possible by the 
remarkable fact that one of the co-authors was a co-founder, first CEO, and Chairman of a 
large Chinese travel-booking company, CTrip. This allowed the authors to run a real 
experiment on a real company at large scale on employees who operated out of a Chinese call 
center. 
 
In the experiment, CTrip conducted a lottery to assign half of 249 interested and qualified 
employees to work from home four days per week (to qualify, they needed six months tenure, 
broadband internet, and a private room to work in). Once chosen, workers were not allowed 
to switch back to a colocated office until the nine-month experiment concluded. The 
experiment found home worker performance increased 13% relative to the control, mostly 
due to an increase in time spent on calls during the workday, which workers attributed to 
quieter working conditions. Attrition also dropped 50%, relative to the control. Based on the 
results of the experiment, CTrip estimated participation in the program saved $2000 per 
worker per year, and expanded the remote work option to its entire company. 
 
While Bloom et al. (2015) provides clean evidence that remote work resulted in higher 
productivity, it is not obvious how applicable the results are outside of their specific context: 
a call center where workers were still geographically constrained by the need to appear in the 
office one day a week. ​Choudhury, Foroughi, and Larson (2019)​ provides complementary 
evidence that full-time remote work policies can increase productivity. 
 
Choudhury, Foroughi, and Larson (2019) study various remote work programs at the US 
patent and trademark office (USPTO). Analogous to the program described in Bloom et al. 
(2015), qualifying patent examiners have access to a program where they work from home 
four days a week and in the office once a week. As with Bloom et al. (2015), USPTO remote 
workers were more productive than their colocated peers, though this analysis is 
observational, not experimental. 
 
The main focus of Choudhury, Foroughi, and Larson (2019), however, is on a more generous 
program for which it is possible to identify the causal impact. In 2011, the USPTO began 
implementing a “work-from-anywhere” program that allowed qualifying examiners to work 
remote all the time, and to relocate to anywhere (though they could be required to return to 
headquarters for up to 12 days or 5 trips per year). This program was oversubscribed, 
resulting in quasi-random allocation of the program to interested workers. Choudhury, 
Foroughi, and Larson (2019) compare the performance of workers selected for the 
work-from-anywhere program to unsuccessful applicants in the standard work-from-home 
program. 
 
They find remote workers in the work-from-anywhere program were 4.4% more productive 
than those in the standard work-from-home program (who were already more productive 
than colocated workers). Suggesting the importance of modern technology for enabling 
productive remote work, they also find a requirement that workers use modern collaborative 
software raised productivity for less experienced examiners (but had no effect on 
experienced ones). 
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These studies provide strong identification that remote workers can actually have higher 
productivity than colocated ones. But again, the applicability of these findings to other forms 
of work could be questioned. Remote work may be less productive than colocation when 
extensive collaboration is required, since face-to-face communication becomes impossible 
with a distributed workforce. Sherman (2019) does include measures of “task 
interdependence” and finds that workers with above median task interdependence did 
experience ​less​ benefit from remote work (and statistically significant only at the 10% level), 
though not a negative effect of remote work. It may well be that the comparatively isolated 
work of patent examiners and call center operators is unusually suited to remote work.  
 
For some suggestive evidence on the effects of remote work on an organization requiring 
extensive collaboration, ​Karis, Wildman, and Mane (2016)​ is a deep dive into how remote 
collaboration works (or doesn’t) at google, based on surveys, observations of meetings, 
interviews, and data on equipment use. The paper concludes, “Technical tools make keeping 
in contact and sharing information much easier than in the past… Although there is no 
effective solution to the time differences involved in long distance East-West collaboration, 
the other challenges are slowly decreasing, and the advantages of having a distributed 
workforce can now be more fully realized.”  
 
Suggesting the ongoing challenges alluded to by Karis, Wildman, and Mane (2016) continue 
to shrink a 2019 ​internal study by google​ (Gilrane 2019) found no difference in the 
effectiveness, performance ratings, or promotions for teams and individuals whose work 
required remote collaboration. Stripe also recently made a large push into remote work, 
noting in its 2019 ​announcement ​(Singleton 2019) that “the technological substrate of 
collaboration has gotten ​shockingly​ good over the last decade” (emphasis in original) and 
that “while we did not initially plan to make hiring remotes a huge part of our engineering 
efforts, our remote employees have outperformed all expectations.” All this evidence together 
suggests the term ​A​ in equation (1) is shrinking, small, and likely less than 1 in many 
industries. 
 
3. Matching ( )/QQr c  
 
Section 2 argues that giving existing workers the option to work remotely does not 
significantly reduce their productivity; indeed, it may raise it. But firms that use remote 
workers also have access to different workers than colocated firms. This section argues the 
expected quality of remote workers, relative to the expected quality of colocated ones              (
), is increasing./QQr c  
 
The basic argument is simple. Remote workers can be hired from the local market but also 
from outside it. Therefore, remote positions can, in principle, access higher quality workers 
anytime there are higher quality workers outside the local market.  
 
The problem for a firm is to identify these workers (and attract them). The next section will 
argue workers find remote positions attractive. This section discusses the steady 
improvement in technology for matching remote workers to interested firms. In the absence 
of direct evidence about trends in the hiring of geographically dispersed remote workers, I 
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focus on three other trends that support the ability of distant firms and workers to match. 
These are: (1) increased use of the internet by job-seekers and employers; (2) development of 
effective algorithms and information on online job markets; and (3) greater potential to form 
and maintain distant relationships via social networks.  
 
Trend 1: Increased use of the internet by job-seekers and employers 
The main technology enabling better matching is, of course, the internet. A large number of 
studies have documented how the internet improves matching of buyers and sellers across 
many markets, such as airlines, books, rental and home vacancies, and food trucks (​Goldfarb 
and Tucker 2019​). Surprisingly, however, studies of the spread of the early internet found 
little evidence it facilitated better matching in labor markets. Studying the use of internet job 
search in 2000, ​Kuhn and Skuterand (2004)​ found it was no better than traditional job 
search. ​Kroft and Pope (2014)​ look at the city-by-city rollout of craigslist over 2005-2007 
and also found no detectable impact on local labor market outcomes (though craigslist did 
reduce apartment vacancy rates and the use of print-based classified ads).  
 
These results are a useful reminder that full utilization of new technologies is not 
instantaneous. ​Faberman and Kudlyak (2016)​ update Kuhn and Skuterand (2004) with data 
from 2011. In the 11 years between 2000 and 2011, the share of the unemployed with home 
internet access rose from 40% to 74%, and the share of unemployed job seekers using the 
internet to find work tripled from 26% to 76%. Using data from 2011, Farberman and 
Kudlyak (2016) find internet job searchers were significantly more likely to find work within 
one year. Indeed, as they point out, the use of internet job search and job postings had 
become so routine at the time of their writing that they are regularly used to study overall 
labor market dynamics by economists. 
 
Online social networks - especially professional networks like LinkedIn - have also emerged 
as a secondary channel through which recruiters can learn about and contact potential hires. 
In 2019, ​27% of US adults have LinkedIn profiles​ (Iqbal 2019). An emerging literature has 
documented that use of online social networks by recruiters is common across a variety of 
countries, though it presents its own challenges ( ​Stopfer and Gosling 2013​, ​Berkelaar 2017​).  
 
Trend 2: Development of effective algorithms and information on online job markets 
A bigger pool of candidates and positions can potentially make sorting through job posts and 
applications more challenging, but a variety of tools and algorithms are being developed to 
facilitate online job matching. Early examples included referral links (which allowed users to 
send promising leads to other people) and online application portals that verify applicants 
meet minimum criteria. ​Brenčič and Norris (2012) ​study the use of these kinds of early job 
search tools by employers posting jobs on Monster.com over 2004-2006, finding they were 
indeed used by firms with the most experience with online job sites.  
 
A number of papers have specifically studied the design of ​oDesk​ (now ​upWork​), an online 
labor market for short-term remote work contracts. ​Horton (2017) ​studies the efficacy of 
algorithmic recommendation tools on match quality on ​oDesk​. Horton’s experiment relies on 
the fact that employers may invite specific ​oDesk​ workers to apply for positions. In 2011, the 
company performed an experiment where it provided recommendations of workers to invite 
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to a random set of new employers. These recommendations were based on the availability of 
the worker (as inferred by​ oDesk​), prior satisfactory performance, and skill match with the 
posted contract. A control group of employers were not shown recommended workers. 
Horton (2017) finds the algorithmically generated recommendations increased the 
probability of finding a suitable worker by 20% for technical jobs (but had no effect on 
nontechnical jobs).  
 
Online labor markets also face issues related to trust. Since ​oDesk​ focuses on short-term 
contracts, these issues are particularly salient and the company has a number of features 
designed to reassure employers workers are not shirking. For example, employers can 
require jobs be completed while using a program that captures screenshots of the worker’s 
computer. More importantly for the question of match quality, ​oDesk ​provides information 
about past performance and does not allow employees to delete all this information (​Agrawal 
et al. 2013​). 
 
This kind of basic information on past performance appears to be quite important in these 
markets. ​Pallais (2014)​ performs an experiment where 952 randomly selected ​oDesk ​workers 
are hired for a 10-hour data entry task, and then given short or detailed publicly viewable 
performance reviews. Workers with these reviews are substantially more likely to be hired 
again on the market, compared to those not hired as part of the experiment. ​Agrawal, 
Lacetera, and Lyons (2013)​ also find validated information on experience significantly 
predicts hiring, even after controlling for other observables, and that this effect is strongest 
for workers from less developed countries.  
 
Trend 3: Greater potential to form and maintain distant relationships via social networks 
While the emergence and steady improvement of online labor markets facilitates matching, 
more than 50% of jobs have typically been found through social ties (​Gee, Jones, and Burke. 
2017​). These matches also tend to be good ones, at least in terms of having lower turnover 
and higher productivity (​Burks et al. 2015​). To the extent that social networks are built by 
physical proximity, this is a powerful force for agglomeration and colocation. Our neighbors 
become friends, and our friends help us find jobs, and the jobs they help us find tend to be 
local. 
 
That said, the emergence of email, videochat, and online social networks like Facebook, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn have the potential to expand our networks of geographically distant 
“weak ties” (relationships that are more acquaintance than friend). These weak ties have long 
been thought to play an important role in job search, since their connections to different 
communities makes them more likely to transmit novel information (​Granovetter 1973​).  
 
Gee, Jones, and Burke (2017) test the weak ties hypothesis using data on 6 million Facebook 
users over 2007 to 2011. They find weak ties (as measured by the extent of overlapping 
friends or the extent of interactions) collectively help users find more jobs than close friends, 
simply because people don’t have many close friends but have many weak ties. Meanwhile, 
Dunbar (2017)​ finds some evidence that social networks help (young) people acquire more 
weak ties. In two 2015 surveys of UK adults, Dunbar finds most users of social networks 
report 150-180 friends on social networks, which is not noticeably larger than the typical size 
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of offline social networks of around 150 (the so-called “Dunbar number”). However, when 
Dunbar breaks his data down by age, it turns out 18-24 year-olds report many more friends - 
282 on average. Most of the increased size of young people’s social networks appears to 
reflect an expansion of weak ties, not close ties. 
 
There’s also some evidence social networks help users maintain geographically distant social 
ties. ​Laniado et al. (2018)​ study user interactions on a popular Spanish online social network 
in 2010. While they find users are more likely to ​be​ friends on the network if they are 
geographically close, once friendships are formed distance barely matters. The extent of 
online interaction between geographically close friends and geographically distant friends is 
very similar. 
 
Online social networks may support the maintenance of a larger network of dispersed 
friends, but they do not necessarily help users form new distant relationships. There is some 
evidence though that this does occur in some online environments that function as “third 
places;” places where people “hang out” online and potentially meet new geographically 
distant people. ​McCulloch (2019​) cites twitter as one example and it has also long been 
recognized that online multiplayer games can function as third places (​Steinkuehler and 
Williams, 2006​), since they are, essentially, a place for people to hang out and interact. 
Molyneux, Vasudevan, and Zúñiga (2015)​ surveyed a large nationally representative group of 
US adults and found players responded affirmatively to statements normally used to 
measure social capital among offline communities, such as “I feel close to the people I play 
games with” and “I feel like I am part of a community of gamers.” ​Trepte, Reinecke, and 
Juechems (2012) ​survey 811 mostly European players of e-sports and find similar evidence 
that online gaming leads to the creation of social capital and offline social support. Online 
gaming is a very new way to form friendships, but one that might become more prevalent in 
the future. Forty-one percent of American adults play video games with other people online, 
averaging nearly five hours per week (​Entertainment Software Association, 2019​).  
 
Finally, the internet and online social networks can also help people maintain relationships 
that are formed offline. A small literature on academic conferences and collaboration 
suggests short in-person meetings at infrequent conferences can be sufficient to establish 
lasting relationships between geographically dispersed individuals (Freeman, Ganguli, and 
Murciano-Goroff 2015, ​Chai and Freeman 2019​, ​Campos, Leon, and McQuillen 2018​, and 
Boudreau et al. 2017)​. Of particular relevance is ​Bakhshi, Davies, and Mateo-Garcia (2015)​, 
which explicitly measures the impact of attending the 2012 Le’Web tech conference on 
attendees’ twitter social network. Following the conference, attendees “followed” other 
conference participants at a much higher rate than they followed non-attendees in the six 
weeks after it’s conclusion. 
 
To sum up, one major advantage of remote work over colocated work is that remote work 
enables firms to access a larger pool of potential hires, and job-seekers to access a larger pool 
of potential employers. This increases the relative quality of the best match for a remote 
worker, relative to a colocated one ( ). However, realizing this advantage requires/QQr c  
employers and employees to find each other. Fortunately, we have a variety of reasons to 
believe the ability of firms to match with remote workers is steadily increasing. Using the 
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internet to search for employees and employers has become common, with better algorithms 
helping both parties sort through the larger pool of potential matches for the best fit. Social 
networks are another important part of job matching, but online social networks and 
communication technology are likely to increase the number of weak ties we can form and 
maintain across geographic distance. 
 
A potential bottleneck to remote work is the tendency of people to most easily form 
relationships with people who are physically proximate. While the internet may make it 
easier to strengthen relationships formed online or via travel, physical proximity remains a 
major determinant in the formation of relationships.  
 
But, framed another way, this can be viewed as a strength of remote work. Remote work 
offers the possibility of remaining physically close to our emotionally close relationships, 
while also pursuing job opportunities that are located far away. While the importance of 
geographic proximity is a problem for creating good matches, it is actually a potential 
strength for attracting geographically distant workers. The next section turns to the general 
question of how firms attract remote workers. 
 
4. Wage Differentials ( )/WW c r  
 
Remote work capabilities allow a firm to access a larger labor market, and this will lead to 
higher quality matches if workers and firms can find each other, and if firms can entice 
distant workers to work for them remotely. The last section reviewed evidence on matching 
at a distance. This section reviews the costs of attracting and retaining remote workers.  
 
Colocation is expensive. ​Autor (2019)​ shows that while the urban wage premium for 
high-school educated workers fell significantly between 1970 and 2015 (as middle-skill urban 
jobs disappeared), the urban wage premium for college-educated workers remains as strong 
as ever. In 2015, a college educated worker in the densest part of the country earned an 
average hourly wage of approximately $25/hr, compared to approximately $15/hr in the 
least dense parts of the country (​Economist 2019​). As will be discussed in section 6, college 
educated workers also tend to have the greatest scope for remote work. If the productivity of 
remote workers is sufficiently close to those for colocated workers, then this suggests 
significant savings are possible for companies that hire remotely. 
 
Variation in the cost of living may also benefit remote workers. ​Moretti (2013) ​estimates 
approximately one-quarter of the college-educated wage premium is accounted for by higher 
cost-of-living in the places where college-educated workers live. In the USPTO’s 
work-from-anywhere program, workers were paid the same salary, regardless of where they 
chose to reside. Choudhury, Foroughi, and Larson (2019) show that participants in the 
program enjoy substantial increases in their real wage by moving to places with a lower 
cost-of-living. 
 
There are potential cost savings beyond salary as well. In Bloom et al. (2015)’s study of 
remote work at CTrip, the company estimated it saved $1250 per worker per year on reduced 
office space costs. The US Patent and Trademark office estimated that it’s 
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work-from-anywhere program saved the agency $38.2mn in office space costs in 2015 alone 
(Choudhury, Foroughi, and Larson 2019). 
 
Bloom et al. (2015) also found remote work reduced turnover by 50%, which led to annual 
savings of $400 per worker. The fact that turnover fell so dramatically suggests workers like 
remote jobs. ​Mas and Pallais (2017)​ attempt to directly estimate the value workers place on 
the option to work from home by performing an experiment with job applicants for a 
position in a call center in 2016. As part of the application process, applicants were shown 
two versions of the position they were applying for, with different (randomly selected) wage 
differentials, and asked to choose which one they would prefer, if both were available. On 
average, workers were willing to accept an 8% pay cut to enjoy the option of working from 
home. Notably, this is far more than they are willing to accept in exchange for other perks, 
such as the option to set their own schedule. 
 
That said, Bloom et al. (2015) find some evidence that work from home was not as valuable 
after workers tried it. After their nine-month experience with remote work, 50% of the 
remote workers opted to return to the colocation option. Only 35% of those who originally 
wanted to work from home took up the option, when it was extended to them after the 
experiment. Interviews suggested workers felt lonely and isolated at home.  
 
On the other hand, in a supplemental experiment Mas and Pallais (2017) find employees 
already working from home were willing to take a 19% pay cut on a hypothetical job to keep 
the option to work from home (compared to a 9% pay cut for those without an existing 
work-from-home arrangement). These results suggest the population that self-selects in 
remote work values it more than the general population. In general, there is no reason to 
believe the value of remote work will not vary across people, firms, industries, and countries. 
 
Taken together, variation in the cost of living, potential savings on office space and turnover, 
and the amenity value of remote work itself are all reasons why the cost of remote workers is 
likely to be lower than the cost of colocated ones. 
 
Declining Geographic Mobility 
 
There is also reason to believe this wage differential may be increasing over time, at least for 
remote workers with the option to work from anywhere. Between 1985 and 2010, the annual 
probability a working age US civilian adult moved to a new state declined from 3.5% to under 
2%, while the share who moved specifically for a new job or transfer nearly halved between 
2000 and 2010 (​Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017​). The trend of declining geographic 
mobility presents another argument for remote work. In section 3, I argued that, compared 
to colocation, remote work has access to a larger labor market and can therefore obtain 
higher quality matches. This, however, ignored the possibility of colocated firms hiring 
distant workers willing to move. This appears to be becoming more difficult though. 
 
Exactly why geographic mobility is on the decline remains an open question. Consistent with 
the evidence in section 3, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017) suggest better information 
about geographically distant jobs has led to reduced mobility (for example, because fewer 
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people move and then move back after discovering they dislike the job or region). ​Hsieh and 
Moretti (2019) ​attribute part of the decline to land use restrictions in major cities, that 
strongly curtailed the expansion of the housing stock. ​Johnson and Kleiner (2017)​ argue 
rising occupational licensing requirements are partially to blame.  
 
But another strand of research suggests the “problem” may be rising attachment to our 
homes: when we have the chance to move for a higher salary, more people prefer the friends 
and family to the money. ​Dahl and Sorenson (2010a) ​and ​Dahl and Sorenson (2010b) 
attempt to quantify the monetary value of physical proximity to close relationships using a 
2003 and 2006 sample of Danish adults. For example, in one exercise, they look at where 
Danish blue collar workers move after the plant they work at closes. By correlating the typical 
salary of blue collar workers in the region where workers eventually choose to reside with the 
presence of friends, family, and other characteristics, they can estimate the dollar value of 
proximity to home. They find a doubling of the distance to the hometown is associated with a 
salary that is approximately $10,000 higher (compared to an average salary of $32,000). 
They find similar sized effects for movement away from friends. Effects are even larger in 
absolute and proportional terms for Danish scientists and engineers who work at 
establishments that are closed. 
 
There are several reasons why home attachment may be rising. First; like any other normal 
good, as society grows richer, it will be willing to “purchase” more proximity to friend and 
family, in this case by forgoing higher salaries not to move. Second; the propensity to move 
declines with age, and our society has grown older. ​Karahan and Rhee (2017)​ argue that the 
aging of the workforce has also had the indirect effect of more local recruitment effort by 
firms, since they know older (distant) workers will be less willing to move; this also means 
younger workers are more likely to be locally recruited though. Third; ​Coate and Mangum 
(2019)​ show the propensity to move is declining in the depth of “roots” an individual has in 
their home region. As families put down deeper roots in the relatively “new” cities of the US 
South and West, their propensity to move from those cities has fallen substantially. If 
workers are less willing to move for the same package of wage and benefits as in the past, 
then this further strengthens the case for remote work. 
 
5. Local Knowledge Spillovers (​S​) 
 
We now turn to ​S​, the strength of local knowledge spillovers. It has been amply documented 
that innovation and economic activity tends to cluster in cities. For example, ​Bettencourt et 
al. (2007)​ show patent production and economic activity cluster in cities at a faster than 
proportional rate - if city ​X​ has twice the population of city ​Y​, it will tend to have ​more ​than 
twice the number of patents and economic activity. A variety of rationales for geographic 
clustering have been suggested, and these can be grouped under the broad headings of 
sharing, matching, and learning (​Duranton and Puga 2003​). In brief, cities allow better 
access to shared assets (infrastructure, but also labor pools and risk), they facilitate matching 
of (colocated) workers to firms, and they allow for the easier exchange of information 
(learning). Because these traits make firms more productive, firms will tend to locate in 
cities, despite the higher costs of doing so.  
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This section focuses on the last of these reasons, the access to knowledge that supposedly 
requires physical proximity. To the extent this is true, the potential advantages of remote 
work are attenuated. Suppose a firm allows workers to work remotely, but requires them to 
reside in the same city in order to enjoy spillovers ​S​. Such a firm is restricted to the same 
local labor market as a colocated firm (or has to induce workers to move), with wages that 
reflect cost-of-living in the region. For such a firm,  ​and  ​are not much larger/QQr c /WW c r  
than 1. Without access to some of the strongest advantages of remote work, firms may decide 
to ask workers to work in a colocated office too. 
 
This section presents evidence that ​S​ is declining and may be equal to 1 for some types of 
economic activity. ​Balland et al (2019) ​look at the extent to which patent activity clusters into 
more populous cities over 1850-2010. They calculate the scaling coefficient for various 
indicators of innovation and economic activity. The interpretation is, that if the scaling 
exponent is ​x​, then a 2-fold increase in population leads to a 2​x​-fold increase in whatever is 
being measured. Like Bettencourt et al. (2007), they find a superlinear relationship (​x ​> 1) 
between patenting and population still holds. But they also find the scaling coefficient 
peaked in 1960. Since then, the extent to which patents cluster into cities has declined.  
 
In this section, I’ll argue the decline in the clustering of innovative activity reflects the 
decline in the importance of local knowledge spillovers - the term ​S​ is equation (1). To begin, 
we’ll look more closely at measures of local knowledge spillovers and show that they too are 
quite likely declining. Then, I’ll argue the decline in ​S​ is driven by better information and 
transportation technology that have made physical proximity less important. 
 
The Strength of Local Knowledge Spillovers is Falling 
The canonical paper establishing the importance of local knowledge spillovers is ​Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993)​. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) attempt to 
establish the importance of local knowledge spillovers through patent citations. The idea is 
that if (1) patent citations indicate knowledge transfers and (2) patents are more likely to cite 
the patents of local firms and inventors, then (3) this is evidence that knowledge transfers 
most readily when it’s local. 
 
But there is a complication. Suppose Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) establish 
patents are indeed more likely to cite local patents. This could be because local knowledge 
transfers more easily than distant knowledge. But it could also be because more of the 
relevant knowledge is nearby. As noted above, clustering can happen for several reasons, 
including reasons that have nothing to do with knowledge transfer (e.g., sharing or 
matching).  
 
To establish citations reflect knowledge transfers, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) 
asks us to consider three patents: ​X​, ​X*​, and ​Y​. ​X​ and ​X*​ are technologically similar patents, 
and ​Y​ is a patent cited by ​X​ but not ​X*​. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) show ​X​ and 
Y​ are more likely to belong to the same city than ​X*​ and ​Y​. In other words, patents are more 
likely to cite local patents, relative to non-citing controls that are technologically similar. 
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Kwon, Lee, Lee, and Oh (2019) ​bring Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) into the 
modern era. They replicate Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993)’s methodology, as well 
as a critique from ​Fox-Kean and Thompson (2005)​, but bring data up through 2015 (and 
with much larger samples of patents). They find patents are even more likely to cite local 
patents today, relative to (various) non-citing controls. 
 
This would seem to suggest local knowledge spillovers are actually strengthening. However, 
two other papers suggest citation-based measures of local knowledge spillovers have become 
increasingly unreliable. 
 
Kuhn, Younge, and Marco (2020)​ show there has been a sharp increase since 2000 in the 
number of citations of dubious quality, driven by an increase in citing essentially every 
patent ever encountered by the applicant (because of a belief that this will better insulate 
their patent against legal challenge). To demonstrate the importance of changing patent 
standard, Kuhn, Younge, and Marco (2020) do a quick and simple update of Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) through 2010, using both the standard set of patent 
citations and a selected sample more likely to reflect genuine knowledge flows (the 
“improved selection”). Using a conventional set of citations, they show the probability a 
citing and cited patent belong to the same city increased from 3.9% to 6.4% between 1975 
and 2010. Using only their sample of high-quality citations, it only increased from 4.3% to 
4.7% though.  
 
But as noted above, these numbers could be driven by non-learning factors that lead to 
geographic clustering. When they implement Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993)’s 
control patent methodology with high-quality citations, they find the increase in the 
probability a citing and cited patent belong to the same city has actually declined. In 1975, a 
citing and cited patent were 3x as likely to belong to the same city as a control and the cited 
patent. By 2010, this was under 2x. In other words, patents are a lot less likely to cite other 
local patents than they used to be. 
 
Arora, Belenzon, and Lee (2018)​ takes a second look at Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 
(1993) and essentially show that a placebo analysis based on patent citations unlikely to 
reflect knowledge flow obtains the same result. In particular, they focus on “citation 
reversals”, which occur when patent ​X ​cites patent ​Y, ​but patent ​Y​ is applied for ​after ​patent 
X​. This occurs about 4% of the time. For citation reversals, it is impossible for the citing 
patent to have read the cited patent, and so it is impossible patent ​X​ learned about patent ​Y 
by reading it. While it may have learned about the patent through other channels, compared 
to a typical citation it is more likely the citation was added to define the scope of the patent’s 
claims or establish patentability, and not as a receipt for borrowing knowledge. Therefore, (1) 
if “typical” citations are more likely to reflect genuine knowledge transfers than citation 
reversals, and (2) local knowledge transfers most easily, then (3) typical citations should 
have a stronger local bias than citation reversals. 
 
Yet Arora, Belenzon, and Lee (2018) show, for a sample of 1.7mn citations over 2001-2014, 
there is no statistically significant difference in the propensity of citations and citation 
reversals to point to local patents (relative to controls). Since citation reversals ​do​ show a 
19 
local bias but are more likely to reflect technological similarity than learning, one 
interpretation is that the Jaffe, Henderson, Trajtenberg (1993) methodology fails to 
adequately control for technological similarity.  
 
I take two main lessons from Kuhn, Younge and Marco (2019) and Arora, Belenzon, and Lee 
(2018). First, citations are an increasingly poor measure of anything beginning after the year 
2000, because of changes in citation practice. Second, the Jaffe, Henderson, and Trajtenberg 
(1993) methodology of using the patent classification system to identify “control” patents 
may be inadequate. Accordingly, I turn to some papers that use neither patent citations (after 
2000) nor the Jaffe, Henderson, Trajtenberg (1993) approach to inferring measure the 
intensity of local knowledge spillovers.  
 
Fitjar and Rodriguez-Pose (2017) ​do not rely on patents at all. To test whether cities facilitate 
chance and casual encounters that result in innovation, in 2013 they ask 542 Norewegian 
firms about the most important partner involved in the creation of a new product or process 
in the preceding three years, and then how this partnership formed. They find casual and 
chance encounters account for about one fifth of these partnerships (targeted search 
accounts for the remaining four fifths). However, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the probability a partnership is formed via chance in and outside cities. Indeed, 
if anything, casual and chance encounters are more likely to result in new partnerships for 
firms based outside of cities. 
 
Mewes (2019) ​investigates a similar question using US patent data. Mewes (2019) assumes 
innovation is about discovering new ways to combine existing knowledge. Access to 
knowledge about different technologies locked away in other people’s heads is quite useful 
for this kind of innovation. And indeed, a paper by Berkes and Gaetani (2019) finds city 
centers do generate more unusual combinations of technologies. 
 
Mewes’ work uses patents, but not patent citations so it shouldn’t have the same data quality 
issues as citation based papers. Instead he uses the technology classifications assigned to 
patents; when a patent is classified as belonging to technology classes ​X​ and ​Y​, Mewes 
interprets this as an indicator that the patent combined pre-existing technologies ​X​ and ​Y​. 
He is particularly interested in novel and unusual combinations of technology, since we 
would expect cities to have disproportionate advantage for these novel combinations. Mewes 
looks at how the size advantage of big cities in producing “atypical” combinations has 
changed between 1850 and 2010. 
 
Mewes’ approach is to calculate the scaling exponent for county population over 1850-2010, 
as in Balland et al. (2019). The interpretation here is, that if the scaling exponent is ​x​, then a 
2-fold increase in population leads to a 2​x​-fold increase in atypical technology combinations. 
The higher is ​x​, the bigger the advantage of a big population in generating unusual 
combinations. But the scaling exponent peaked in the 1970s and has been on a steady decline 
since. Big cities no longer have as strong an advantage in generating unusual combinations of 
technology. 
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Packalen and Bhattacharya (2015)​ take a different tack again. They scan the text of all 
patents and pull out important one-, two-, and three-word sequences (e.g., “microprocessor” 
and “polymerase chain reaction”). They call these word(s) “concepts” and interpret them as 
technological ideas. Because they can observe the date each concept is first mentioned in a 
patent, they can measure the “age” of the idea. They then look at whether patents in cities use 
newer ideas than patents from outside cities. They find the patents of big cities used to have a 
much higher probability of mentioning a very young concept, but this faded over time. By the 
2000s, they can no longer rule out zero effect. 
 
Besides patents, academic papers represent another avenue for studying the importance of 
local knowledge spillovers. Unlike patents, there is little concern over the quality of citations 
in academic references. Focusing on a set of 5.5 million pairs of papers from 2012 and 2014, 
Wuestman, Hoekman, and Frenken (2019)​ study the importance of geographic proximity in 
academic research by estimating the probability a cited paper’s authors work within 20km of 
the citing paper’s authors. And they find papers are indeed more likely to cite local work.  
 
However, just as with patents, this may not actually reflect the fact that knowledge transfers 
more easily at the local level. It may simply be that different regions specialize in different 
kinds of research (for reasons that have nothing to do with local knowledge spillovers) and 
local citations merely reflect the location of relevant knowledge. This seems to be partially 
the case. When Wuestman, Hoekman, and Frenken (2019) restrict attention to citations 
between papers drawing on similar knowledge, they find local papers are no longer any more 
likely to be cited. That said, citations between papers that are dissimilar does seem to retain a 
local bias. But the analysis does not let us ascertain whether this has fallen over time or not. 
 
Lastly, ​Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009)​ examine the research productivity of academics in 
economics and finance over 1970-2000. By keeping track of the moves of individual 
academics, they can see how the productivity of researchers changes when they move to top 
universities (where research productivity is measured in terms of how many articles they 
write per year, adjusted for the quality of journal). In this way they can infer the impact of 
colocation with other academics on the individual productivity of a researcher. They find the 
positive impact of being in a top university declined in each decade, such that there was no 
positive impact of being in a top university during the 1990s. Similarly, the research 
productivity of colleagues in a department was positively correlated with an individual’s 
research output in the 1970s, but after controlling for individual productivity, this effect 
disappears in the 1990s.  
 
Better Transport and Communication Technology Facilitates Access to Distant Knowledge 
Thus, recent work finds the strength of local knowledge spillovers, measured in various ways 
is falling or quite low in the last decade. In this section, we present evidence that this is 
driven by improvements in transportation and communication technology.  
 
Catalini, Fons-Rosen, and Gaule (2018)​ look at academic collaboration between chemists 
living in different cities after Southwest Airlines opens a new route connecting them. They 
find in the years after new (low-cost) airline routes connect them, chemists publish 50% 
more articles co-authored with chemists on the other end of the route. The effect is stronger 
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for collaborations across different fields and when both chemists are more productive than 
the average for their department - both cases when being able to reach outside your local 
contacts is important. Similar effects exist for other disciplines. 
 
It’s not only planes. ​Dong, Zheng, and Kahn (2018)​ look at collaboration between academics 
in China when cities are connected by high speed rail. They find similar results (although 
their results are more fragile and can partially disappear depending on the econometric 
method): after a high-speed rail line is built between two cities, there is an increase in the 
number of papers coauthored by academics based in the cities. This effect is strongest when a 
“secondary” city is connected to a “mega” city, and when the cities are close enough so that 
high-speed rail becomes faster than air travel. 
 
The evidence from airplanes and high-speed trains is consistent with roads as well. ​Agrawal, 
Galasso, and Oettl (2017)​ look at what happens to innovation when US regions build more 
highways. Agrawal, Galasso, and Oettle (2017) look at private sector innovation and focus on 
the local impact, rather than how interstates enable collaboration across regions. They find a 
10% increase in regional highways is associated with 1.7% more regional patents over 5 years. 
 
But peek beneath the surface and this is another story of how falling transportation costs 
erode the importance of local knowledge. The authors focus on citations patents make to 
other patents from the same region: the more roads, the greater the distance between these 
patents. They also show the impact of roads is strongest in low-density cities, where 
inventors are more geographically disperse. Intuitively, after my city builds a new interstate 
I’m more likely to cite patents from across the city instead of across the street, especially if 
there aren’t many inventors nearby. Roads enable more local-but-not-that-local knowledge 
flows. 
 
In general, anything that increases access to distant knowledge can erode the importance of 
being physically proximate to people. ​Furman, Nagler, and Watzinger (2018)​ study the 
impact of patent depository libraries on local innovation. Comparing recipients of these 
libraries to nearby eligible sites that did not receive libraries, they show increased access to 
information (i.e., the text of patents) increases local patenting by 17%. Moreover, patents 
from inventors living near patent libraries are more likely to cite patents belonging to more 
distant inventors. The library apparently reduces the need to be near other inventors to make 
use of their ideas. 
 
Of course, you still need to be near the library. Or at least, you did, until the internet. 
Furman, Nagler, and Watzinger (2018) also show the local impact of patent depository 
libraries evaporates once the first internet searchable patent databases become available in 
1995. 
 
Improvements in digital communication technology have the same effect of facilitating 
remote collaboration and reducing the need to be geographically proximate. ​Forman and 
Zeebroeck (2012)​ and ​Forman and Zeebroeck (2019)​ both look at how internet access 
changes the collaboration patterns of firms with geographically dispersed establishments. To 
measure the impact of internet access, the papers have to reach back a long way, to the 
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1992-1998 era, when internet access was first beginning to roll across America. Forman and 
Zeebroeck (2012) show that after two establishments are connected to the internet, inventors 
in the connected establishments are more likely to be jointly listed on patents. In contrast, 
getting internet access doesn’t seem to have any impact on the number of solo-inventor or 
geographically clustered inventor team patents, which suggests the internet’s main 
advantage was in facilitating collaboration, not merely in increasing access to knowledge. 
 
But it does that too. Studying the same era, Forman and Zeebroeck (2019) show that when 
two establishments are connected to the internet, patents by inventors from one 
establishment are more likely to cite patents by inventors from the other.  
 
The preceding papers show internet access facilitates access to distant knowledge, but do not 
directly address the issue of whether this leads to less geographic clustering of inventive 
activity. ​Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2014)​ do. They compare the growth of regional 
patenting over 2000-2005 to patent levels over 1990-1995. Overall, they see a significant 
increase in the concentration of inventive activity: the counties with the most patents over 
1990-1995 also had the fastest growth of patents over 2000-2005. What is novel, however, is 
that they show this effect is reduced by greater internet access.  
 
For example, consider two counties with low internet connectivity in the 1990s. Specifically, 
among all US counties, suppose they are at the 25th percentile for internet adoption. If one of 
these counties was also in the 90th percentile of 1990s patents, it experienced annual patent 
growth in the 2000s that was 5.4% faster than a comparable county in the 25th percentile for 
1990s patents. 
 
Now consider two counties with high internet connectivity in the 1990s (the 90th percentile 
for internet adoption). If one of these counties was in the 90th percentile of 1990s patents, it 
experienced annual patent growth in the 2000s that was just 0.4% faster than a county in the 
25th percentile. The innovation gap between counties grew much more quickly for counties 
without much internet access. 
 
What’s more, the difference between high-internet adopting and low-internet adopting 
counties is largest when we restrict attention to patents featuring distant collaboration 
among inventors. One interpretation of these results therefore is that people living in 
innovative counties in the 1990s didn’t really need the internet to find potential 
collaborators, so it’s presence or absence didn’t matter that much. But people living in less 
innovative regions benefited a lot from internet access, because it allowed them to find good 
collaborators and participate in the innovation economy. 
 
Summary 
This section began by noting that geographic clustering of economic activity tends to be 
clustered in cities, but that this clustering has actually fallen along some dimensions over the 
last several decades. Geographic clustering can be caused by a variety of factors, sometimes 
grouped under the headings sharing, learning, and matching. This section has proposed that 
the learning advantage of geographic proximity (represented by ​S​ in equation 1) has been 
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falling for a long time, due to improvements in communication and transportation 
technology.  
 
6. The Rise of Remote Work 
 
The previous four sections review a wide range of evidence to argue the four terms in 
equation (1) are all moving to make remote work more attractive. The productivity of 
individual colocated workers relative to remote ones (​A​) is quite close to or less than one, at 
least in some industries and as technology continues to advance, this is likely to be true in 
more industries. The ability to find high quality remote workers from large national labor 
markets ( ) is rising as we move more and more of our social and professional lives/QQr c  
online. The cost of colocated workers relative to remote ones is greater than one ( ),/WW c r  
and may be growing if home attachment continues to rise. And the knowledge spillovers that 
accrue to collections of colocated workers (​S​) is falling rapidly, and may even be gone.  
 
If this theoretical framework is correct, then firms should also be aware of it and at some 
point we should begin to see an increasing share of positions go remote. In the presence of 
adjustment costs, this process may be slow to get going, but at some point it should still 
occur. In this section, I review evidence that, pre-covid-19, we were already seeing the rise of 
remote work. 
 
The easiest place to start is simply by looking at census data, which asks whether 
respondents work from home. Figure 3 presents the share of non-farm workers working 
from home. 
 
Figure 1. Share of Nonfarm Workers Working From Home, 1960-2017 
 
Note: Data from 1960-1990 is drawn from census means of travel to work data and available 
in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 - other values are imputed. Data from 2000-2017 is drawn 
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from the American Community Survey means of transportation to work data and is available 
annually. Data queried from IPUMs by Lyman Stone.  
 
The share of people working from home has risen from a low of around 2.0% in 1980 to 
nearly 5.0% by 2017, and has accelerated in the most recent years. These workers can be 
divided into two types: self-employed workers and wage-earners, with the latter category a 
better match for the kind of remote work envisioned in this essay. Breaking out wage-earners 
suggests some of the increase in work-from-home between 1980 and 2000 was driven by an 
expansion of the self-employed. However, since 2000, most of the increase in work from 
home has been driven by increases in the number of wage-earners working from home; that 
is, from an increase in remote work. 
 
Since these numbers focus exclusively on those who work from their home, they omit those 
who work from satellite offices, co-working spaces, coffee shops, and other alternatives. 
Accordingly, they understate the true extent of remote work. A 2019 survey commissioned by 
Upwork and the Freelancers Union finds a similar share of people who work from home as 
the census (about 5%), but found that including alternative work sites raises the share of 
remotes to 9.5%; including those who work remotely some of the time increases the 
percentage to about 36.1% (​Ozimek 2019​). 
 
The ability to work remotely varies significantly by industry. Only 8.8% of leisure and 
hospitality workers have the option to sometimes work from home, but more than 50% of 
workers in the information, financial activities, and professional and business services 
industries do. Within industry, the option to work remotely is concentrated in management, 
business, and financial operations occupations (60.1%), and to a lesser extent in professional 
and related occupations (42.5%). Lastly, the option to work remotely is heavily concentrated 
in high earning and high education positions. Fully 51.9% of workers with a bachelor’s degree 
or higher have the ability to work from home (some of the time), as do 61.5% of those in the 
top earning quartile (​BLS 2019​). 
 
A variety of evidence suggests we are a long way from reaching the limits of remote work. To 
begin, the 2016 Understanding America Survey simply asked a representative sample of US 
adults whether their job could feasibly be completed from home. Among college educated 
workers, 41% say yes. Among those with a high school degree or less, the number is 14% 
(​Mas and Pallais 2020​). Alternatively, ​Dingel and Neiman (2020)​ use data from two 
Occupational Information Network surveys on “work context” and “generalized work 
activities” to estimate the share of jobs that can plausibly be done remotely today. Their 
approach is to rule out occupations as a candidate for remote work if their survey responses 
indicate the job cannot be performed online (for example, if the average respondent says 
they have to wear protective or safety equipment, they would consider the position 
unsuitable for remote work). Using this approach, they estimate 34% of jobs can be done 
remotely (though they interpret this number as an upper bound). Lastly, in 2017-2018, 
28.8% of workers aged 15 and over could work from home at least some of the time (and 
24.8% did at some point) (​BLS, 2019​). Together, these studies suggest in the current job 
landscape, an upper bound of one fifth to one third of jobs can be done completely remotely, 
though this number will be skewed toward high education positions. 
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There is also demographic momentum for an increase in remote work. Ozimek (2019) finds 
69% of Gen Z and millennial hiring managers allowing team members to work remotely, 
compared to 58% of baby boomer hiring managers. And more than 40% of small business 
owners aged 18-34 planned to hire full-time remote workers, compared to just 10% of small 
business owners aged 50 and up. And though the differences are smaller, younger workers 
are typically more interested in working remotely or are already working remotely. All this 
suggests demographic changes, on their own, could make remote work more prevalent, even 
without the changes documented in this paper. 
 
An alternative measure of our ability to work remotely is to look at trends in the extent of 
knowledge work conducted by geographically dispersed collaborators: patents and academic 
papers. Figure 4 plots the share of US-coauthored scientific publications with (1) authors 
belonging to multiple institutions and (2) international collaborations. 
 
 
Figure 4. Share of US Scientific Articles with Multiple Institutions and 
International Institutions, 1996-2018 
 
Note: Data from the ​National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2020. 
Articles are all journal articles listed in Scopus with at least one US-based coauthor. 
 
The National Science Foundation data does not report the share of publications that are 
produced by colocated and remote collaborators, but two proxies are available. First, the 
share of papers with multiple institutions provides a rough proxy for remote collaboration, 
since the majority of papers written by distant collaborators will belong to different 
institutions. This measure has increased from 55% in 1996 to 76% in 2018. This likely 
exaggerates the extent of remote collaboration though, since two co-authors may belong to 
different institutions that are geographically close. A second proxy that does not share this 
issue is the share of papers with a US institution and at least one institution belonging to 
another country. This has risen from 17% to 39% over 1996-2018. This measure likely 
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understates the extent of remote collaboration, since it omits collaborations between 
geographically distant US institutions. Note that both measures may also be biased if 
coauthors belong to different institutions but temporarily reside in the same place while 
collaborating, or if they belong to the same institution but reside in different places while 
collaborating (i.e., because one of them is on sabbatical). So long as this bias does not 
systematically increase over 1996-2018, the trend is still towards more remote collaboration. 
 
Freeman, Ganguli, and Murciano-Goroff (2014)’s ​survey of papers in the fields of particle 
and field physics, nanoscience and nanotechnology, and biotechnology and applied 
microbiology, provide evidence that suggests the above trends reflect a genuine increase in 
remote collaboration. Freeman, Ganguli, and Murciano-Goroff (2014) map the institution of 
each co-author to an associated city. They define papers as “US-collocated” if all coauthors 
belong to the same (US) city. By this measure, the share of papers with at least one distant 
collaborator in their sample rises from 0.5 to just over 0.6 over 1990 to 2000, and then stays 
constant slightly above 0.6 through 2010. Figure 4 shows a similar trend for the overlapping 
time period: the share of papers with multiple institutions rose during the late 1990s before 
getting stuck around 67% between 2003 and 2011. From then on, however, the share of 
papers with multiple institutions steadily climbed to 76% by 2018. 
 
As an alternative to academic collaboration, we can look at the location of inventors listed on 
US patents. The US Patent and Trademark Office’s Patentview website lists the latitude and 
longitude of each inventor, which can be used to calculate the distance between inventors. 
Figure 5 displays the average distance between inventors listed on a patent for patents with 
1-5 inventors (which account for the vast majority of patents) and for patents with exactly 2 
inventors.  
 
Figure 5. Average Distance (km) Between Inventors on a Patent, 1975-2015 
 
Notes: Distance is the average across all US patents applied for in a year of the average 
pairwise distance between all inventors listed on a patent, for patents with 1-5 inventors. 
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Patents with 1 inventor have a distance of 0. Data comes from patentsview inventor location 
data. 
 
The average distance between inventors stayed between 800 and 1,000 km between 1975 
and 1990, and then began to steadily climb toward 1,800 km by 2015. However, this 
aggregate measure conceals a composition effect as the number of inventors per patent has 
also steadily risen over this period (though this might also be driven by easier distant 
collaboration). However, even when attention is restricted to patents with two inventors, we 
see a steady rise in the average distance between collaborators, from approximately 400 km 
to 1,000 km between 1975 and 2015. 
 
Alternatively, we can look at the extent of colocation by computing the share of patents with 
inventors who are unlikely to be collocated. Figure 6 reports the share of all patents with two 
inventors where the inventors are over 100 km apart and over 500 km apart.  
 
Figure 6. Share of Two-Inventor Patents where Inventors are Greater than 
100km and 500km apart, 1975-2015 
 
Notes: Data from patentview.org. 
 
Figure 6 indicates it is indeed becoming more common for geographically distant inventors 
to collaborate on a patent. Inventors more than 100km apart accounted for 37% of 
two-inventor patents in 1975, and 50% of two-inventor patents in 2015. This is down slightly 
from a peak of 52% in 2007. However, the share of two-inventor patents with inventors more 
than 500 km apart rose from 22% to 34%  over the same period. 
 
Summary 
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Sections 2-5 presented a wide variety of reasons why remote work is becoming more 
attractive, relative to collocation. As predicted, remote work actually is becoming 
increasingly commonplace, as measured in a variety of ways. Remote collaboration on 
patents and academic research has grown to the point where it is no longer unusual. The 
share of positions that are performed from the home has begun to rapidly rise (from a very 
low base), especially since the mid-2000s. And these numbers seem to have a lot of scope to 
continue rising, given the estimates of the share of positions that can be performed remotely. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
The preceding has presented a set of reasons why remote work is likely to become more 
common. The individual productivity of remote workers appears to be quite high in many 
industries and will likely to continue to improve with technology. Technology for matching 
firms to geographically distant workers is also improving rapidly. And remote workers are 
likely to be cheaper than colocated ones. The spillover benefits of colocation have declined 
substantially, as better communication and transportation technology enables ideas to 
circulate more widely. Finally, many firms and workers seem to agree with this assessment, 
as the extent of remote collaboration is rising. 
 
Promoting Remote Work for the Public Good 
For the most part, the arguments for remote work presented in this paper are about private 
costs and benefits of remote work. They are likely to push the economy towards a greater use 
of remote work, whether or not the government adopts policies to promote remote work. 
However, there are also positive externalities from remote work, such that active government 
policy to promote it may be desirable. These go beyond their utility in combating any future 
pandemics. 
 
First, remote work may be able to raise aggregate productivity for the economy. In most 
models of agglomeration economies, there are benefits to greater agglomeration - such as 
better matching or learning - but these are eventually offset by costs associated with 
congestion (Duranton and Puga 2003). These models pin down the predicted population of 
cities or regions by finding the population level for which the benefits of moving to the city 
for a potential new arrival (due to agglomeration effects) are exactly offset by the costs of 
moving (due to congestion costs). To the extent that there are positive externalities from 
agglomeration, in these models it can be optimal to adopt policies that encourage more 
people to move into cities, since that increases the size of the economy, which can be 
redistributed as desired (Hsieh and Moretti 2019, ​Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman 
2019​).  
 
However, these models assume the benefits of agglomeration are only obtainable through 
physical proximity. As discussed in sections 3 and 5, learning and matching may not much 
depend on physical proximity anymore, if firms switch to a remote work equilibrium. If we 
can move into an equilibrium where we can obtain the benefits of agglomeration without 
congestion costs, then in principle we can benefit from (digital) agglomeration of many more 
workers, without the attendant congestion costs. In practice, this means a remote 
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equilibrium could potentially support the excellent matches and exchange of knowledge of a 
very large and dense city, without the associated housing and commuting costs. 
 
Second, remote work can reduce geographic inequality. The increased importance of 
agglomeration effects over the last several decades have led to economic prosperity for cities 
and economic decline in rural areas. This has had significant political and social cost 
(​Wilkinson 2019​, ​Case and Deaton 2020​). While remote work is not a panacea, by 
decoupling where people live and work, it spreads economic activity more equitably and may 
reverse the tendency for economic activity to cluster in a small number of superstar cities. 
 
Third, remote work may contribute to a reduction in carbon emissions by reducing 
commuting. This reduction will not be to zero for a number of reasons: it may be partially 
offset by more frequent long-distance travel to meet colleagues face-to-face; workers may 
still commute to coworking space or satellite offices; it may enable workers to live in smaller 
cities which are less energy efficient. Still, it is easy to imagine the net effect will be towards 
less emissions. 
 
If there are indeed positive externalities associated with remote work, then government 
policy to promote remote work is appropriate. An examination of potential policies is beyond 
the scope of this essay, but I here suggest a few possibilities.  
 
Policy #1: IT Infrastructure  
 
Most obviously, remote work is only feasible when there is a robust underlying IT 
infrastructure. This means continued support for expanding broadband access to rural areas.  
An alternative approach would be to create community hubs for remote work, or to 
encourage coworking space companies to set up shop in small communities. Shared hubs 
could reduce the fixed cost of remote work by providing equipment for rent that may 
currently be too expensive for individual workers to own. They could also offer IT support 
and a more reliable internet connection.  
 
Policy #2: Subsidies for Remote Work  
 
It may be desirable for federal, state, and local governments to offer wage subsidies and 
other incentives for distant firms to hire local remote workers. This would be a micro version 
of the much larger tax breaks that are used today to try and lure businesses to invest locally. 
Essentially, the argument for subsidies is that there are positive externalities to remote work, 
so that it will be practiced at a lower than optimal rate without subsidies (at least initially).  
 
Policy #3: Online Education and Training 
 
Support for online degrees and worker training programs tailored to the needs of remote 
workers are also desirable. At present, those with the skills to work in the knowledge 
economy largely reside in cities, since that’s where the jobs are. To skill up the kind of people 
who would most benefit from remote work, we need to offer online degree programs.  
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Online education has several virtues. First, it can serve as a screen on both employers and 
employees. The kinds of students who excel at online education are more likely to excel as 
remote workers too. Moreover, online education gives students an opportunity to try out the 
remote work lifestyle, while gaining a valuable skill. If it turns out they don’t like it, they can 
transfer to a traditional university. To be effective screens, the courses should practice 
collaborative team-based pedagogy as much as possible. This would most develop the soft 
skills for working remotely, and would have the additional benefit of accelerating the 
development of norms for online collaboration and work.  
 
Policy #4: Fostering Online Communal Spaces  
 
Lastly, we need to support the continued emergence of communal spaces for online 
socializing and the exchange of ideas. This should occur across a diversity of spaces, to make 
remote work feasible for the broadest group of people possible. Supporting this work could 
take the form of grants for research, or experimentation with new forms of online 
community (analogous to grant support for the arts). At a minimum, the desirability of 
having places people want to hang out online should factor into the discussion around 
regulating big tech, which runs many of these platforms.  
 
Covid-19 and Remote Work 
But in the short run, the most important push for remote work is the global covid-19 
pandemic. I am writing in the midst of a massive natural experiment about the capability of 
remote work. For the first time ever, nearly everyone capable of working remotely is doing so 
for an extended period of time. Surely, we will learn a lot about where it works and doesn’t 
soon. 
 
However, it is important to be aware of the ways in which the current shift to remote work 
diverges from the arguments made above. Firms switching to remote work may learn that 
the relative productivity of remote workers (​AS​ in this paper) is higher than they believed. 
However, the current transition to remote work is far from ideal. It is rushed, often with 
minimal training, equipment, or coordination. Many remote workers are also taxed with 
caring for children who are home from school and daycare (me, for example). Some are ill, or 
caring for the ill. All of these factors may pull down the productivity of remote workers. 
 
It is also occurring in an environment of extreme economic uncertainty. It may be harder for 
firms to learn the productivity of workers, given huge shocks to demand for goods and 
services. At the same time, for workers the experience is likely to feel more socially isolating 
than it would typically be, since it is occurring simultaneously with generalized social 
distancing.  
 
Moreover, many of the potential benefits of remote work do not apply in this environment. 
The current cohort of new remote workers is drawn from the local labor market, with all the 
attendant costs of office space and colocated wages. Firms are not benefitting from better 
matches or lower salaries. Neither are workers benefiting from better matches or higher real 
wages.  
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However, despite all these caveats, it may still be that remote work becomes significantly 
more common after the emergency use of it during the pandemic subsides. Some firms will 
learn that positions can be done remotely, and will begin to hire remotely. Many firms and 
workers will also emerge from the pandemic with upgraded remote capabilities, ranging 
from digital infrastructure, to organizational strategies, to workplace norms. Perhaps most 
importantly, as suggested by equation (1), it may be that there are multiple equilibria in the 
type of work. Remote work faces a coordination problem: for firms, it’s not worth investing 
in remote infrastructure if there are not many people looking for remote work, and for 
workers it’s not worth looking for remote work if there are few firms offering it. Covid-19 
might push us out of this equilibrium, into a new one. 
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